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INTRODUCTION

HOPE VI must have seemed so promising. When, in 1992, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) introduced the program later dubbed
"HOPE VI,"' replacing the country's worst public housing projects with
mixed-income, mixed-use, low-density new developments while providing
targeted social services to low-income residents must have seemed like a worthy
pursuit indeed. America's most run-down, crime-ridden, and poverty-plagued
residential properties could be transformed into "human-scale" New Urbanist
streetscapes, aesthetically continuous with surrounding areas, that would inspire

* J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center. My most grateful thanks to Amber Murray,
Managing Editor extraordinaire.
1. In its early years, the program was called the "Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program"
interchangeably with "HOPE VI." Where not otherwise indicated, I use "HOPE vr' to refer to both the
Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program and HOPE VI because they are in essence a single
program.
The "HOPE" in "HOPE VI" was the name of the existing umbrella grant program under which the
Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program was initially organized. See S. Rep. No. 356, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. at 40 (Aug. 30, 1992). HUD and others variously list it as an acronym for "Housing
Opportunities for People Everywhere" and "Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere."
See, e.g., SusAN J. POPKIN ET AL., A DECADE OF HOPE VI: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY CHALLENGES,
1 (2004) [hereinafter Popkin, DECADE]; U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Homeownership and
Opportunity for People Everywhere (Hope I), http://www.hud.gov/progdesc/hopelfin.cfm [hereinafter
Hope I].
Also under organized the "HOPE" rubric were other public housing-related grant programs. HOPE I
provided grants to organizations to help low-income people purchase public housing units; it last
awarded funds in 1994. See Hope I, supra. HOPE H (HOPE for Homeownership of Multifamily Units)
provided grants to organizations to help tenants purchase (and rehabilitate, if necessary) governmentowned or -financed multifamily projects; it was last funded in 1995. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
[sic], and HI and Youthbuild Programs, http://www.hud.gov/sec4.cfm. HOPE [H
Section Four: Hope I, m11
(HOPE for Homeownership of Single Family Homes) gave similar grants for purchasing single-family
dwellings and similarly received no funding after 1995. Id. HOPE IV (HOPE for Elderly Independence
Demonstration) provided grants to public housing authorities to combine Section 8 rental assistance
vouchers with support services so that very low-income senior citizens could remain in independent
living environments; it was last funded in 1993. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Hope for Elderly
Independence (Hope IV), http://www.hud.gov/progdesc/hope4fin.cfm.
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pride and community in their residents. 2 Perhaps most importantly, HOPE VI's
required social service component might have seemed, at last, to recognize
certain structural aspects of poverty by providing holistic support services-to
include health care, day care, job-training, and transportation-to public housing
residents. And, with federal grants of up to $50 million to each project selected,
intended to be used to leverage private, philanthropic, and other public financing
that can increase the capital available for a given project by several times, 3 the
program might have seemed sufficiently well-funded to make good on these
promises.
Twelve years on, HOPE VI has been a mixed blessing.4 Proponents point to
Atlanta's Centennial Place, Louisville's Park DuValle, and Washington, D.C.'s
Townhomes on Capitol Hill as shining examples of urban neighborhood
revitalization under HOPE V15 and cite Seattle and Oakland as communities that

2. PETER CALTHORPE & WiLLtAM FULTON, THE REGIONAL CITY, 254 (2001); Ngai Pindell, Is There
Hope for HOPE VI?, 35 CONN. L. REv. 385, 420-424 (2003); Awards Recipients, Hope VI
Mixed-Finance Public Housing, 2000 Winner, http://www.ashinstitute.harvard.edu/Ash/hopevi.htm; Ray
Gindroz, City Life and New Urbanism,29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1419, passim (2002).
New Urbanism is a school of thought in urban design that emphasizes multi-use development,
walkable neighborhoods, community- and pedestrian-oriented public spaces, and aesthetic harmony
between new development and existing buildings, including "traditional" architectural forms. Dating
from the late 1980s, "[ilt is committed to re-establishing the relationship between the art of building and
the making of community." Gindroz at 1427-28; see also Calthorpe & Fulton, supra, 254-56; Congress
for the New Urbanism, Charter, http://www.cnu.org/aboutcnu/index.cfm?formAction=charter.
3. See, e.g., Popkin, DECADE, supra note 1, at 2.
4. The work of leading HOPE VI researcher Susan Popkin, though on balance more positive than that
of many commentators, consistently reflects this mixed verdict. See, e.g., Susan J. Popkin, The HOPE V1
Program: What About the Residents?, 3 (2002) [hereinafter Popkin, What About the Residents?] (HOPE
VI "has the potential to improve former residents' lives, but it also can put vulnerable families at
significant risk"); HOPE VI Reauthorization and Small Community Mainstreet Revitalization Housing
Act: Hearing on H.R. 1614 Before the House Comm. On Financial Servs,, 108th Cong. 1 (2003)
(statement of Susan J. Popkin), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/900614.html [hereinafter
Popkin Testimony] ("Our findings indicate that the effects of the program on original residents have been
mixed, but on balance the story is generally positive"); Margery Austin Turner, G. Thomas Kingsley,
Susan J. Popkin, & Martin D. Abravanei, Urban Inst. What Next for Distressed Housing? (2004),
http://www.urban.org/publications/1000654.html ("[HOPE VI] has produced some of the most promising innovations in the history of federal efforts to revitalize distressed urban neighborhoods. But it is also
responsible for some dismal failures, particularly when it comes to the relocation of vulnerable
residents").
5. See, e.g., Calthorpe & Fulton, supranote 2, at 256-58; Patrick E. Clancy & Leo Quigley, HOPEVI:
A Vital Tool for Comprehensive Neighborhood Revitalization, GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 527, 541
(2001); J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheersfor Gentrification,46 How. L.J. 405,428 (2003).
This note focuses on such HOPE VI "revitalization grants," which account for over $5.8 billion of the
almost $6.2 billion that HOPE VI granted between fiscal years 1993 and 2005. U.S. Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., About HOPE VI, http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about [hereinafter
About HOPE VI]. Between fiscal years 1996 and 2005, HOPE VI also made grants of almost $440
million for demolition only and grants of more than $2.4 million in 2005 for affordable housing
development in connection with older downtown business district revitalization in communities with
populations less than 50,000. Id.; U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Main Street Grants, http://
www.hud.gov/offices/pihlprograms/ph/hope6/grants/mainstreet/. HOPE VI also made grants of less than
$15 million for "planning" only between fiscal years 1993 and 1995. About HOPE VI, supra.
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developed extensive services and community-building programs with HOPE VI
funds. 6 They note that "original" residents 7 who received housing vouchers have
moved to census tracts with an average poverty rate of 27%, a stunning 34%
decrease from the average poverty rate in their original census tract. 8 But, as even
HOPE VI's most ardent advocates admit, there have been serious failures in
implementation; 9 HUD's own internal auditor has found substantial administrative problems in its two program-wide reviews. o The United States Government
Accountability Office (GAO, formerly the Government Accounting Office) has
identified inconsistent oversight of HOPE VI projects and failure to meet annual
reporting requirements as significant weaknesses in HUD's administration of the
program. Some researchers, community activists, and "original" residents of
HOPE VI redevelopment sites have criticized the program for 1) failing to collect
data about and report on project outcomes," 2) slashing the stock of affordable
housing ("essentially in half or to a third"' 2 in some areas) while improving
bricks-and-mortar neighborhoods at the expense of "original" neighborhood
residents; 1 3 3) failing to account for existing structural racial hypersegregation
and isolation from economic opportunity;1 4 and 4) subordinating HUD's public
mission to market values of cost-minimization and efficiency.15

6. See generally ARTHUR J. NAPARSTEK & SUSAN R. FREIs, HOPE VI: COMMUNITY-BUILDING MAKES A
DIFFERENCE (2000).

7. By "'original' residents" and "'original' households," I mean a HOPE VI site's resident population
at the earliest HOPE VT planning, whatever form that initial "planning" may have taken. For this usage,
see, e.g., Popkin Testimony, supra note 4; MAUREEN KENNEDY & PAUL LEONARD, GENTRIFICATION:
PRACTICE AND POLITICS, 1 (2001).
8. G. THOMAS KINGSLEY ET AL., HOPE VI AND SECTION 8: SPATIAL PATTERNS IN RELOCATION 10

(2001); see also ABT AssoC., INC., & URBAN INST., THE HOPE VI RESIDENT TRACKING STUDY 79 n.46
(2002) [hereinafter RESIDENT TRACKING 20021.

9. See, e.g., Clancy & Quigley, supra note 5, at 533-35; Popkin, supra note 4.
10. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF FISCAL YEAR
1996 HOPE VI GRANT AWARD PROCESS (1997), available at http://www.hud.gov/oig/ig8hOOOl.pdf
(finding, inter alia, that HUD awarded $381 million of Fiscal Year 1996 HOPE VI funds to 37 ineligible
applicants); U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NATIONWIDE AUDIT:

HOPE VI URBAN REVITALIZATION PROGRAM (1998), available at http://www.hud.gov/oig/ig960001.pdf
[hereinafter 1998 HUD Audit] (identifying problems with program oversight, resident involvement, and
supportive services).
11. See, e.g., NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT ET AL., FALSE HOPE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
HOPE VI PUBLIC HOUSING REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 31-36 (2002) [hereinafter FALSE HOPE].

12. See, e.g., Lynn E. Cunningham, Islands of Affordability in a Sea of Gentrification: Lessons
Learned from the D.C. Housing Authority's HOPE VI Projects, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 353, 358 (2001) (discussing the outcome of four projects in Washington, D.C.).
13. See, e.g., FALSE HOPE, supra note 13, at 17-31, 37-41 ENPHRONT [EVERYWHERE AND Now
PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENTS ORGANIZING TOGETHER], A HOPE UNSEEN: VOICES FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF

HOPE VI (2003) [hereinafter HOPE UNSEEN]; Pindell, supra note 2, at 394-95.
14. See, e.g., john a. powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving them the Old "One-Two":
Gentrificationand the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color,46 How. L.J. 433 (2003); Pindell,
supranote 2, at 399-402; FALSE HOPE, supra note 11, at 38.
15. See Note, When Hope Falls Short: HOPE VI, Accountability, and the Privatizationof Public
Housing, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1477 (2003) [hereinafter When Hope FallsShort]. Compare Harry J. Wexler,
HOPE VI: Market Means/PublicEnds-The Goals, Strategies, and Midterm Lessons of HUD's Urban
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The HOPE VI program has even been characterized, pejoratively, as the public
housing aspect of urban gentrification.1 6 In an era of upper-middle-class return
from the suburbs to the cities, it replaces public housing with developments
intended to draw higher-income people to the urban core where public housing is
typically located. By replacing high-poverty, often high-density public housing
with mixed-income, low-density development, HOPE VI projects certainly
harmonize with the return of higher-income white people from the suburbs and
physical improvements to (and increasing rents and property values in) formerly
run-down areas of the urban core. And, in the process of pursuing the goal of
poverty deconcentration, HOPE VI projects have accelerated the displacement of
lower-income-indeed, lowest-income-residents of color in city centers where
HOPE VI target sites have been "islands of affordability in a sea of gentrifica17
tion.

'

,

This displacement is occurring in the context of a deepening affordable
housing crisis-what may well be "an unprecedented and growing imbalance
between demand for housing and the ability to produce an adequate supply at an
affordable cost." 18 And this crisis, for a complex of reasons, disproportionately

Revitalization DemonstrationProgram, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 195 (2001) (a rosier view of HOPE
VI's public/private amalgam).
16. See Cunningham, supra note 12, at 357 (describing HOPE VI project in Capitol Hill as "look[ing
to 'original' residents] like another tool in the hands of the area's gentrifiers to reduce the number of
affordable units"); powell & Spencer, supra note 14. For various definitions of gentrification, see, e.g.,
KENNEDY & LEONARD, supra note 7, at 2.
17. Cunningham, supra note 12. Deconcentrating poverty has been one of the key elements of the
program. Of necessity, then, in almost every HOPE VI project there are fewer (sometimes dramatically
fewer) units on-site for "original" residents when the redevelopment is finished. See, e.g., GEN.
ACcOUNTING OFFICE, HOPE VI: PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN REVITALIZING DISTRESSED PUBLIC HOUSING,
1 (1998) [hereinafter PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS]. In gentrified or gentrifying urban cores, as Cunningham
(among others) observes, this is a recipe for Urban Renewal-like displacement of poor people of color if
not managed properly. See id. at 366; FALSE HOPE, supra note 11, at 37-41. And, in fact, in a limited
study of Section 8 voucher use with HOPE VI relocation, the average distance that relocatees have moved
from their original neighborhood was 3.9 miles, soaring over 5.5 miles in larger cities. KINGSLEY ET AL.,
supra note 8, at 2; see also RESIDENT TRACKING 2002, supra note 8, at 11-56 (maps accompanying case
studies of eight HOPE VI sites chart "original" resident displacement over wide area). These results make
the program at least consonant, if not congruent, with unregulated gentrification. In worst-case scenarios,
such as Boston's Clippership development, local public housing authorities actually appear to be
colluding with developers to clear a newly-desirable site of existing public housing so that it can be
developed for higher-income consumption, regardless of whether it is truly "severely distressed." See
When Hope Falls Short, supra note 15, at 1494-95.
18. E.g., Molly A. Sellman, Equal Treatment of Housing: A Proposed Model State Code for
ManufacturedHousing, 20 URB. LAW. 73, 74 (1988). See also, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Housing Crunch
Worsensfor Poor; HUD Aid No Match for Soaring Rents, Fewer Apartments, WASHINGTON POST, Oct.
12, 1999, at Al ("By all accounts, the nation is mired in a severe affordable-housing crisis, with record
low vacancy rates, rents rising at twice the rate of inflation, interminable waiting lists for federal aid, and
an unprecedented 5.3 million families paying half their incomes in rent."); cf. also, e.g., Popkin, What
About the Residents?, supra note 4, at 3 ("By 2002, a minimum-wage worker could not afford to rent a
standard two-bedroom unit in any U.S. city"); see also C6sar E. Torres, The Housing CrisisFacing Low
Income Families, 29 SETON HALL L. RaV. 1498, 1502-06 (1999); Jason DeParle, The Year That Housing
Died, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, October 20, 1996.
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affects women: woman-headed households are twice as likely as the total
population to face critical housing needs.1 9 Yet neither HOPE VI's proponents
nor its critics have seriously considered its gender dimension. In this context of
urban gentrification, affordable housing crisis, and racial hypersegregation, I
argue, HOPE VI discriminates against lowest-income African American women
because it disproportionately destabilizes the economically-precarious, femaleheaded households who predominate in the severely-distressed public housing
projects its grants have targeted.
This Note applies "intersectional" feminist analysis to explore this hypothesis. 2 ° Part I reviews the historical development of HOPE VI and the statutory
and regulatory structure of the program. Part II identifies the predominance of
lowest-income African American women living in public housing targeted by
HOPE VI grants and outlines how the program's shortcomings are likely to have
had unique negative impacts on these householders as African American women,
distinct from those it may have had on African American men and non-African
American men and women. Part HI proposes disparate impact litigation and
policy reform as remedies for these discriminatory effects. In closing, I consider
the political prospects for reforming HOPE VI to mitigate its raced and gendered
disparate impact.
I. THE ROAD TO HOPE VI
HOPE VI was born during "a tumultuous period in HUD's history,'' 2' to say
the least. Indeed, during HOPE VI's early years, HUD faced the possibility of
being dismantled altogether.2 2 To appreciate the crisis facing HUD in the early
1990s, and how HOPE VI formed a crucial part of the Department's response, a
brief survey of American public housing history is in order.
A. Public Housing in the United States to the Late 1980s
Although there were some federal and local government initiatives to
subsidize housing before the New Deal, most consider modern American public

19. See McAuley Institute Briefs Congressional Staff on Women's Need for Affordable Housing, 31
No. CD-7 HDR CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 11 (2003) (citing HUD's 2001 American Housing Survey).
20. Kimberh6 Crenshaw is often credited with introducing this concept to legal scholarship in her
article Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,
43 STANFORD L. REV. 1241 (1991). The non-additive/intersectional identity analytic had found earlier
form in literary criticism. See, e.g., Deborah E. McDowell, New Directionsfor Black Feminist Criticism,
in THE NEW FEMINIST CRITICISM (Elaine Showalter, ed. 1985); GLORIA ANZALD(JA, BORDERLANDS/LA
FRONTERA: THE NEW MESTIZA (1987).
21. Clancy & Quigley, supra note 5, at 535.
22. See, e.g., Guy Gugliotta, HUD: Enabling Upgrades in Housing, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 20,
1994, at A16 ("The president gave us a direct order-change... or face elimination of HUD," said
Department secretary Henry Cisneros. "There is something about the prospect of elimination that focuses
your attention."); Bob Herbert, Renovating HUD, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 18, 1998, at WK15.
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housing to have begun with the United States Housing Act of 1937.23 For the first
time, as millions of formerly middle-class people became unable to afford
adequate housing as a result of the Depression, the federal government
systematically took responsibility for housing those who could not afford to
compete for "decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings" in the private market.2 4
Significantly, however, the 1937 Act linked that task with goals of job creation
and "slum clearance"; indeed, "alleviat[ing] unemployment" preceded "remedy[ing] housing conditions" in the statutory text.2 5 And the 1937 Act specified
26
"families of low-income," both urban and rural, as its intended beneficiaries.
That is, the 1937 Act's intended beneficiaries were not the very poor, but rather
middle-class people temporarily impoverished by the Depression.27 As a result, it
was initially believed that no federal outlay would be required beyond the initial
development costs. 28 But because rents were fixed, the cost of upkeep soon
outpaced incoming rents, and units quickly deteriorated.29
Public housing was, however, racially segregated "from its beginnings, 30 and
was frequently the site where policymakers and politicians proved willing to
"compromise[] in the face of popular demands for economic and racial
segregation.'
In the postwar period, suburban growth took off, supported by
explicitly racist federal home loan guarantee policies that discouraged homeownership in racially-mixed city neighborhoods and heavily subsidized "white
flight" to the suburbs.3 2 Public housing, which had mainly been built on the sites
of old slums, was left stranded in city centers, now largely inhabited by people of
color and the very poor.3 3 Not until 1962 did official segregation end in federal
public housing, but that decade's mass construction of large inner-city public
housing projects guaranteed that de facto racial segregation remained, and the
federal government's ongoing unwillingness to fund public housing maintenance

23. See, e.g., Torres, supra note 18, at 1501; Howard Husock, We Don't Need Subsidized Housing,
CITY J., Winter 1997, at 52. The earliest federal intervention in housing issues appears to have been an
1880 grant of $20,000 to study housing in the United States. ROBERT MOORE FISHER, TWENTY YEARS OF
PUBLIC HOUSING 9 (1959), cited in Michael S. FitzPatrick, Note, A Disaster in Every Generation: An
Analysis of HOPE VI: HUD'sNewest Big Budget Development Plan, 7 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 421,

424 (2000).
24. Wagner-Steagall Housing Act, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) [hereinafter 1937 Act]. On the
middle-class target population for New Deal federal housing, see, e.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN,
GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION 99-109 (1968).
25. 1937 Act, supra note 24.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 24, at 106.
28. See id. at 107-09.
29. See id.
30. Pindell, supra note 2, at 400.
31. Id. at 402.
32. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 53-55 (1993); Friedman, supra note 24, at 142-57, 197-98.
33. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 32, at 45-48, 55-57; Friedman, supra note 24, at 117, 122-24.
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34
assured that these developments too would deteriorate speedily.
By the late 1980s, most Americans considered public housing to be an abject
failure.35 At the turn of the decade, scandals revealed an estimated $2 billion of
losses resulting from fraud, influence peddling, and alleged misappropriation of
funds at HUD's highest levels during the Reagan era.3 6 HUD's Assistant
Secretary for public housing described many local public housing authorities as
"patronage parlors of disaster.",37 In the midst of this crisis, near the end of the
first year of the George H.W. Bush administration, Congress created the National
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (hereinafter "the Commission") to identify the country's worst public housing projects, consider existing
strategies for addressing their problems, and develop a plan for future federal
government action.38 The aim, Congress decreed, was "to eliminate by the year
2000 unfit living conditions in public housing projects determined by the
Commission to be the most severely distressed. ' 39 From this Commission came
the proposals that, under mounting political pressures, quickly generated HUD's
Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program, later to be dubbed HOPE VI.

B. From the National Commission Report to HOPE VI
Almost three years after the Commission was established, just a few months
before the presidential election of 1992, it released its final report. After
considering development size, vacancy rates, occupancy by children, "family
distress," 40 crime rates, and physical deterioration, the Commission estimated
that about 6% of the nation's public housing, approximately 86,000 units,

34. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 32, at 56-57; FitzPatrick, supra note 23, at 430-31.
35. See, e.g., Popkin, What About the Residents?, supra note 18, at 2. This view continued to flourish
through the 1990s. See, e.g., Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Decent Home for Every American: Can the 1949
Goal Be Met?, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1619, 1639 (1993); Press Release, National Low Income Housing
Coalition, Voters Decry Big Government Housing Initiative But Applaud Nonprofits' Efforts, available
at http://www.nlihc.org/pubs/mediapr.htm (Mar. 3, 1998). In 1998, the Pew Center for the People and the
Press found that HUD tied with the CIA for second-least favorably-perceived federal agency (the Internal
Revenue Service, unsurprisingly, was the least favorably-perceived). Pew Ctr. for the People & the Press,
How Americans View Government: Deconstructing Distrust, http://people-press.org/reports/display.
php3?ReportlD=95 (Mar. 10, 1998).
36. See, e.g., The Reagan Scandals, WAStINGTON POST, July 30, 1989, at C6.
37. Michael DeCourcy Hinds, Public Housing Ills Lead to QuestionsAbout H. U.D., N.Y. TIMEs, July
20, 1992, atA8.
38. Pub. L. No. 101-235, Tit. V, §§ 501-07 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-la).
39. Id.
40. See NAT'L COMM'N ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUB.HOUSING, THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUBLIC HOUSING: A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE SECRETARY

OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, App. B-2 (1992) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. "Family distress"
encompassed 1) lack of social and support services in the family's immediate area, 2) lack of employment
opportunities, 3) low education, employment, and income rates, and 4) highly concentrated poverty in the
area. Id. at App. B-3-B-5.
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qualified as "severely distressed., 41 Living conditions in these units, the
Commission testified, caused their residents "almost unimaginable" suffering.4 2
Nevertheless, the report expressly emphasized that the great majority of the
public housing stock remained sound and "continue[d] to provide an important
rental housing resource for many low-income families. 43 To address the needs
of "severely distressed" public housing projects and their residents, the Final
Report advised, the federal government must support physical improvements,
management improvements, and community support services to meet residents'
needs. 44 In the strongest terms, the Commission called on the nation to "act now
to eliminate the public failure, the national disgrace, that we almost euphemistically call severely distressed public housing. 4 5 Mere weeks after the Final
Report was released, Congress responded by authorizing and funding the Urban
(alternately called HOPE V146) in the
Revitalization Demonstration Program
47
act.
appropriations
1993
year
fiscal
The Demonstration Program was intended "to go beyond bricks and mortar to
address the social and economic needs of the residents. .. and the health of their
surrounding neighborhood" through an annual competitive grant regime for local
public housing authorities (PHAs).4 8 The Demonstration Program legislation
emphasized that grants of up to $50 million each should go to PHAs proposing
major reconstruction of the most dilapidated projects in the country's forty most
populous cities. 49 Any one Demonstration Program grant could be used to
improve up to 500 units in up to three different geographical areas, which PHAs
had to identify according to the standards of "severe distress" outlined in the
Commission's Final Report.5 0 The legislation required a community services
component in each grant proposal and enumerated some of the supportive
services envisioned in the Final Report, established a ceiling of 20% of the grant
to be used for that purpose, and mandated local matching of federal social
services funding up to 15% of the grant amount. 51 The legislation emphasized the
need to replace units lost to the affordable housing stock as a result of the new

41. Id. at 2. The Commission arrived at the 6% number by estimating the number of units requiring
modernization that would cost more than 60% of HUD's Total Development Cost (TDC) guidelines. Id.
at 15. The TDC estimates the amount required to replace a unit of public housing, not including certain
related costs such as site acquisition. Id. at 32; see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 941.103,941.306 (2006).
42. FINAL REPORT, supra note 40, at xiv.
43. Id. at 2.
44. See id. at 9-33.
45. Id. at 6.
46. See supra, note 1.
47. Pub. L. No. 102-389, Tit. II (1992). HUD describes HOPE VI as a "direct result" of the report.
U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HOPE VI PROGRAM AUrTHoRrr AND FUNDING HISTORY 1 (2003),
availableat http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/prograins/ph/hope6/about/fundinghistory.pdf.
48. Popkin, What About the Residents?, supra note 4, at 2.
49. See Pub. L. No. 102-389, supra note 47.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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program, with no more than one-third of the units eliminated by any program to
be replaced in the form of vouchers, and specifying that the remaining two-thirds
must be replaced by "hard units,"5 2 whether in "conventional public housing" or
in new construction or other rehabilitated units with equivalent resident
eligibility standards.53 And, finally, the legislation authorized HUD to halt
funding to any PHA that did not
"proceed in a manner consistent with the plan
54
community.,
that
for
approved
From fiscal year 1993, s 5 then, PHAs have submitted proposals in response to
annual HUD Notices of Funding Availability (hereinafter NOFAs) that outline
the factors to be considered in making each year's HOPE VI grants and the
weight to be given each factor in the grantmaking process. HUD has never issued
standard notice-and-comment regulations for the program.5 6 Instead, it has
administered the program through 1) annual NOFAs, which can change from
year to year,57 2) the terms of its individual contracts with grant-recipient PHAs,

52. For the term "hard unit," see, e.g., W. David Koeninger, A Room of One's Own and Five Hundred
Pounds Becomes a Piece of Paperand "Get a Job": EvaluatingChanges in Public Housing Policyfrom
a FeministPerspective, 16 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv., 445, passim (1997).
53. See Pub. L. No. 102-389, supra note 47.
54. Id.
55. By the time the program was re-funded for fiscal year 1994, "HOPE VI" was apparently the
preferred program name, and eventually "Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program" was dropped
altogether.
56. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., HOPE VI, http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/
about/description.cfm ("No regulations have been published for the HOPE VI program."); see also GAO,
PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 17.
57. The 2003 NOFA, for example, listed as the program's key elements:
(1) Improve the living environment for public housing residents of severely distressed public
housing projects through the demolition, rehabilitation, reconfiguration, or replacement of
obsolete public housing projects (or portions thereof);
(2) Revitalize sites (including remaining public housing dwelling units) on which such public
housing projects are located and contribute to the improvement of the surrounding
neighborhood;
(3) Provide housing that will avoid or decrease the concentration of very low income families;
and
(4) Build sustainable communities.
U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Notice of Funding Availability: Revitalization of Severely
Distressed Housing; HOPE VI Revitalization and Demolition Grants, Fiscal Year 2003 (2003)
[hereinafter 2003 NOFA].
The NOFA included, inter alia,the following application criteria, with their relative weight:
Need-24 points total;
Community and Supportive Services-6 points total;
Disability Issues-4 points total;
Fair Housing-3 points total;
Well-functioning Communities-8 points total;
Overall Quality of Plan-19 points total;
Leveraging-16 points total;
Resident and Community Involvement-3 points total;
Relocation-5 points total.
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and 3) by sub-regulatory "guidance" and "work plans. '5 8 "To an unusual extent,"
Popkin has written, "the program has been shaped more through implementation
than by enactment."5 9
As a result, the terms and conditions of HOPE VI-funded projects have varied
considerably over time as well as from site to site; "HOPE VI has not been 'one
program' with a clear set of consistent and unwavering goals." 6 Indeed, for good
and for ill, flexibility and local control have been program watchwords. 61 For
example, site selection became particularly flexible despite the fact that the
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (hereinafter QHWRA)
codified as "severely distressed" as any project that:
i. requires major redesign, reconstruction, redevelopment, or partial or total
demolition... ;
ii. is a significant contributing factor to the physical decline and disinvestment
... in the surrounding neighborhood;
iii. is occupied predominantly by ... families with children that are very low
income, whose members are unemployed and dependent on various forms
of public assistance, or has high rates of vandalism and criminal activity;
and
62
iv. cannot be revitalized through assistance under other programs.
Under the terms of later NOFAs, a PHA applying for a HOPE VI grant needed
only to submit two certifications to be eligible: one certifying that the existing
housing meets the definition and one prepared by an architect or engineer hired
by the PHA certifying that the project is in severe physical distress.63 The "soft
side of HOPE VI" 64 has also varied a great deal, with the amount that PHAs were
required to spend on resident services such as childcare, job training, and
relocation services steadily decreasing, even as HUD began to monitor support
services more closely and to provide PHAs with technical assistance. 65 And, as
HUD encouraged PHAs to leverage HOPE VI grants to raise private and
philanthropic funds, the program was increasingly characterized as a catalyst for
neighborhood reinvestment, rather than primarily as a program to improve living

Id.
58. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., HOPE VI, supra note 56; Pindell, supra note 2, at 391;
FALSE HOPE, supranote 11, at 18.
59. Popkin, DECADE, supra note 1, at 2.

60. Id.
61. See, e.g., NAPARSTEK & FREis, supra note 6, at 9; Popkin, DECADE, supra note 1, at at 2-3.
62. QHWRA, supra note 73, § 513.d.2 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437v (2006)). This
definition has been amended slightly for clarity since 1998.
63. See, e.g., 2003 NOFA § V(A)(4)-(5).
64. Popkin, DECADE, supra note 1, at 33.
65. See id.
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conditions for residents of the most "severely distressed" public housing. 66 In
fact, GAO and the HUD Office of the Inspector General have both found that
HOPE VI has shifted its focus from the most severely distressed large public
housing developments to smaller projects with greater appeal to private
investors.67 As NOFAs rated applications with a high ratio of leveraged funds to
HOPE VI resources more and more highly, 68 say some critics, HUD actually
encouraged PHAs to demolish projects that were not only smaller, but also
located in neighborhoods already in the process of gentrifying, because those
areas could be counted on to draw substantial investment from private
developers. 6 9

In substantial part, HOPE VI's shifting priorities reflected wider trends in
national housing policy. Over the course of the 1990s, HUD and Congress
increasingly emphasized employment and eventual "self-sufficiency" as the
goals for public housing residents-what some have called the "in, up, out"
policy.70 As Section 8 housing vouchers, which individuals may use to acquire
rental housing from private landlords, became an increasingly important
component of national housing policy, Congress repealed the "one-for-one"
replacement rule: HUD was no longer obligated-as it had been since 19377 '-to
replace every "hard unit" of public housing demolished or otherwise removed
from the stock.72 With the passage of the QHWRA, which some characterize as
the "welfare reform" of public housing policy, 73 Congress repealed rules that had
given preference to very poor (including homeless) families in public housing
resident selection and allowed PHAs to take steps to attract higher-income

66. Cf. Popkin, DECADE, supra note 1, at 17, 1. Compare Sean Zielenbach, Catalyzing Community
Development: HOPE VI and Neighborhood Revitalization, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY
DEV. L. 40, 73 (2003) ("HOPE VI was not designed to be an economic development program").
67. PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 26; 1998 HUD Audit, supra note 10, at 8.
68. See supra note 57.
69. When Hope Falls Short, supra note 15, at 1483 (citing U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Notice
of Funding Availability for Revitalization of Severely Distressed Public Housing HOPE VI Revitalization Grants; Fiscal Year 2002, § IX(G)(1), (July 31, 2002)).
70. See generally, e.g., Koeninger, supra note 52; Lisa A. Crooms, Families, Fatherlessness,and
Women's Human Rights: An Analysis of the Clinton Administration's Public Housing Policy as a
Violation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 36
BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 1 (1997-98) [hereinafter Crooms, Fatherlessness];cf. also Popkin, DECADE, supra
note 1, at 15.
71. 1937 Act, supra note 24, § 8. Though what qualified as a "replacement unit" had loosened
considerably over time, and eventually included housing vouchers, the basic commitment to one-for-one
replacement remained in place. Compare id. with 42 U.S.C. § 1437p (1992); 42 U.S.C. § 14 3 7 p (1994);
and 42 U.S.C. § 14 3 7p (1995).
72. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance for Anti-Terrorism
Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occurred at Oklahoma City, and
Recissions Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, Title 1 (1995). This move apparently had HUD's support: in
its 1995 self-reform document, HUD had endorsed allowing PHAs to "replace" demolished "hard units"
with direct tenant assistance such as Section 8 vouchers. See U.S. DEP'T OF HoUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD
REINVENTION: FROM BLUEPRINT TO ACTION, 2, 6-7 (1995).

73. See Crooms, Fatherlessness,supra note 70.
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As of 2003, fifteen of 165 HOPE VI grant-recipient projects had been
completed; 63,100 units had been demolished and plans approved to demolish
another 20,300 units 75 with an estimated potential net loss of 107,000 "hard
units" of public housing.7 6 Through fiscal year 2005, HOPE VI "revitalization"
grants totaled more than $6 billion dollars.7 7 Annual grants had peaked in fiscal
year 1994, with more than $750 million granted, and again in fiscal year 1999,
with more than $570 million.78 In late 2003, HOPE VI's incorporation into the
1937 Act was extended through 2006, and appropriations for 2003 again totaled
about $570 million. 79 HOPE VI has survived the Bush administration's annual
efforts to do away with it altogether since 2004, but appropriations plummeted to
$150 million in 2004 and $144 million in 2005,80 and sank further to $100
million for fiscal year 2006.81
The HOPE VI program was in its infancy when-with the politically
ascendant Newt Gingrich declaring on the front page of The Washington Post that
"you could abolish HUD tomorrow morning and improve life in most of
America, ' 82 and President Clinton apparently in agreement 83-HUD embarked
on a rapid self-reinvention. Nevertheless, HOPE VI was essential to, and indeed
quickly became the flagship program of, this reinvention. Increasingly merging
HUD's public mission with market mechanisms, HOPE VI became consonant
with the privatizing, anti-government, anti-entitlement political mood of the

74. Popkin, DECADE, supra note 1, at 15-16 (citing Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276 (1998)).
75. Id. at 2.
76. FALSE HOPE, supra note 11, at 7.
77. About HOPE VI, supra note 5. According to HUD, HOPE VI operated solely by annual
congressional appropriation-i.e., without statutory authorization-between fiscal years 1993 and 1999.
Id.. A coalition of housing advocacy organizations led by the National Housing Law Project disputes this
characterization, citing a 1996 HUD-commissioned report that describes HOPE VI authorization as
deriving from the 1992 Housing Act's modifications to § 24 of the 1937 Act. FALSE HOPE, supra note 11,
at 2 n.14. This report characterizes HUD's current position as an attempt "to avoid complying with
provisions of the U.S. Housing Act." Id. By 1999, at the latest, HOPE VI was certainly incorporated into
the 1937 Housing Act (as amended) via the QHWRA.
78. FUNDING HISTORY, supra note 47, at 9.
79. Pub. L. No. 108-186 Tit. IV, § 4029(e) (2003); U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HOPE VI
13, available at http:/www.hud.gov/offices/pihlprograms/phlhope6/aboutl
APPROPRIATIONS
hope6appropriations.pdf.
80. Popkin, DECADE, supra note 1, at 3; MINDY Tutnov & VALERIE PIaR, BROOKINGS INST., HOPE VI
AND MIXED-FNANCE REDEVELOPMENTS: A CATALYST FOR NEIGHBORHOOD RENEwAL 58 (2005), available
at http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20050913_hopevi.pdf.
81. David Nather, Low-Level Targets ofSpending Cuts, CQ WEEKLY 3376, Dec. 26,2005, availableat
http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/document.php?id = weeklyreport1 09-000002017853&type=
toc&num=86&.
82. Kenneth J. Cooper, Gingrich Pledges Major Package of Spending Cuts Early Next Year
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 13, 1994, at Al. In a not-so-veiled threat, House Speaker-elect Gingrich
continued, "I think HUD's reputation is now so bad.., and the whole public housing policy has been
such a failure that it's very hard to sustain HUD." Id.
83. See Gugliotta, supra note 22.
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1990S.84 By the end of the decade, HOPE VI was the only significant means by
which the federal government funded new affordable housing construction.8 5
II. HOPE VI, RACE, AND GENDER
In the process of redeveloping the sites of "severely distressed" public
housing, HOPE VI necessarily displaces most of the sites' "original" residents
either temporarily or permanently. Statistically, the tens of thousands of
households 8 6 displaced by HOPE VI redevelopment projects are disproportionately headed by African American women with children-not only in comparison
to the U.S. population as a whole, but also in comparison to the general public
housing population. In the context of the affordable housing crisis, existing racial
hypersegregation and isolation from economic opportunities, the gendered wage
gap, and urban core gentrification, displacement can destabilize these households
in race- and gender-specific ways. That is, what researchers and activists alike
have identified as serious structural and administrative problems in HOPE VI
have distinct and disparate impacts on these households because they are
disproportionately headed by lowest-income African American women.
To date, however, researchers have essentially left uninvestigated HOPE VI's
impact at the convergence of race and gender. 87 Even when commentators think
to mention that the "'residents living in despair' [discussed in the Commission's
Final Report] were primarily minority women and children-predominantly
African-American and extremely poor,' 88 the gender element immediately drops
out the subsequent discussion.8 9 Indeed, data is not even compiled in such a way
as to make gender legible as a category of analysis in many housing statistics,
including most studies of HOPE VI. For example, The HOPE VI Resident
Tracking Study, "the first systematic look at what has happened to original
residents of distressed public housing developments targeted for revitalization
under the HOPE VI program," 90 provides charts of data on survey respondents'
ages, races and ethnicities, number of children in household, and years lived in

84. See, e.g., When Hope Falls Short, supra note 15; Koeninger, supranote 52.
85. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Public Housing Development, http://www.hud.gov/
progdesc/pdev.cfm ("HUD has not provided new funding for public housing development since [fiscal
year] 1994"); FitzPatrick, supra note 23, at 423.
86. See KINGSLEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 7.

87. Though perhaps not an ideal example of feminist analysis, Koeninger, supra note 52, is a notable
exception. Seven years on from Koeninger's article, Lisa A. Crooms appears to be the only figure
"bring[ing] a feminist approach, or at least a feminist perspective, to public housing policy" in the legal
literature. Id. at 447. Her work is somewhat idiosyncratic, however, and is significantly as much cultural
analysis as policy commentary. See, e.g., Crooms, Fatherlessness,supra note 70.
88. Popkin, DECADE, supra note 1, at 8.

89. Id. (The paragraph proceeds: "In other words, African-American and Hispanic residents suffered
the effects of living in the worst public housing. .. [A] staggering 88% of the people who lived in the
neighborhoods surrounding the severely distressed developments were minorities.").
90. RESIDENT TRACKING 2002, supra note 8, at i.
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public housing, but not on respondents' genders. 9 1 But by comparing the
gender-related statistic that the demographers most regularly track-the number
of female-headed households with children 92 -with income and race/ethnicity
data, we can estimate the disproportion of the impact of HOPE VI on
lowest-income African American women.
A. The StatisticalPredominanceof Lowest-Income African American Women in
HOPE VI Target Communities
As leading HOPE VI researcher Susan Popkin observed in testimony to the
House Financial Services Committee in 2003, "the problems HOPE VI seeks to
address are among the most complex and difficult to solve.

93

It may not be not

surprising, then, to learn that there are significant demographic differences
between the public housing population as a whole and the segment of that
population living in the nation's most "severely distressed" public housing
projects.
First, the average HOPE VI "original" household is likely to be even poorer
than the average public housing household. Although the total percentage of all
public housing households with an annual income of less than $15 ,00194 is
comparable to the total percentage of HOPE VI "original" households making
less than $15,001 per year,95 the distribution within this range of extremely low

91. Id. at App. A-132-133, A-135-136. See also, e.g., SUSAN PopirN ET AL., ABT Assoc. INC., AN
HISTORICAL AND BASELINE ASSESSMENT OF HOPE VI, VOLuME I: CRoss-SITE REPORT, 3-10-11 (chart of
HOPE VI site "Resident Characteristics" that includes race/ethnicity, median income, and income
source), 4-13-17 (chart of HOPE VI site "Neighborhood Demographics and Resources" that includes
racial/ethnic and poverty rate statistics) (1996).
Further complicating matters, detailed statistics on HUD-assisted renters and their units are published
irregularly; at writing, the most recent "snapshot" compiled data for 1998. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., A Picture of Subsidized Households in 1998 (1998) [hereinafter PicruRE 1998]. See also DUANE T.
McGOUGH, U.S. DEP'T OF HoUS. & URBAN DEV., CHARACTERISTICS OF HUD-ASSisTED RENTERS AND
THEIR UNrrS IN 1993 (1997) [hereinafter CHARAcTERISTicS 1993].
92. The fact that this is the gender-related statistic that demographers of subsidized housing
consistently find noteworthy may itself be significant. Cf generally Lisa A. Crooms, The Mythical,
Magical "Underclass": ConstructingPoverty in Race and Gender Making the Public Private and the
PrivatePublic, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 87 (2001) [hereinafter Crooms, "Underclass"] (arguing that
welfare reform "support[s] the proposition that.., public poverty is a matter of private gender
dysfunction" and perpetrates "the myth [of] pathologically raced and dysfunctionally gendered.., poor,
black men, women, and children in inner city ghettos").
93. Popkin Testimony, supra note 4, at 1.
94. At 81% in 2004. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Resident Characteristics Report as of May 31,
2004: Public Housing; National-US (2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Characteristics2004].
This report engine was formerly known as the Multifamily Tenants Characteristics System (MCTS). For
the period of November 2004 to March 2006, the percentage of all public housing households with
annual income of less than $15,001 stood at 77%. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Resident
Characteristics Report as of Feb. 28, 2006: Public Housing; National-US (2006) (on file with author).
95. At 79% in 2002. See SUSAN J. PopKIN ET AL., HOPE VI PANEL STUDY: BASELINE REPORT, 2-2
(2002) [hereinafter BASELINE 2002]. This is the only major study of HOPE VI populations at "baseline,"
before HOPE VI activities begin. Congress commissioned this study in 1999; the researchers planned to
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incomes is markedly different for the subgroup of people living in severely
distressed sites targeted by HOPE VI. Only one-fifth of all public housing
households make less than $5,000 annually; 96 more than one-third of the HOPE
VI sample's household incomes fall under $5,000. 9 7 Whereas 42% of all public
housing households have yearly incomes between $5,000 and $10,000,98 only
31% of HOPE VI "original" households do. 99 Only 14% of HOPE VI "original"
households'0° make between $10,001 and $15,000 annually, compared to 18% of
public housing households generally.' 1o Therefore the population living in HOPE
VI target sites is more likely than the public housing population at large to be
10 2
living in the most extreme poverty.
Second, HOPE VI "original" households are dramatically more likely to be
headed by African American women. HUD's 2004 Resident Characteristics
Report for public housing estimates that 38% of all public housing households
are female-headed households with children. 103 But an estimated 66% of
"original" HOPE VI households with children have single female heads.' °4
Though the 2004 Resident Characteristics Report estimates that 47% of all public
housing heads of household are African American,10 5 the Panel Study Baseline
Report estimates that 89% of people who head HOPE VI "original" households

publish biannual reports on the living conditions and well-being of "original" residents of five
developments in which HOPE VI-funded revitalization began in mid- to late 2001. Id. at i, ix. As we do
not yet have an update, however, for purposes of closer comparison with this baseline report, I will use
2004 demographic profiles of public housing residents generally.
96. Characteristics2004, supra note 94, at 1.
97. BASELINE 2002, supra note 95, at 2-2.
98. Characteristics2004, supra note 94, at 1.
99. BASELINE 2002, supra note 95, at 2-2.
100. Id.
101. Characteristics2004, supra note 94, at 1. Further, twice as many HOPE VI site residents report
receiving welfare as residents of public housing generally do. Compare id. (16% receiving welfare) with
BASELINE 2002, supra note 95, at 2-2 (32% receiving welfare). But a higher percentage of HOPE VI
households report wages as part of their income than in the general public housing population. Compare
BASELINE 2002, supra note 95 (37%), with Characteristics2004, supra note 94 (31%).
102. Under HUD definitions, households are "low income" if their annual income is at or below 80%
of the "area median income" (AMI) or "median family income" (MFI) for households in their geographic
area. "Very low income" is at or below 50% of AMI/MFI, and "extremely low income" is at or below
30% of AMI/MFI. See FALSE HOPE, supra note 11, at iii; U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Notice
PDR-2004-01: Estimated Median Family Incomes for 2004, Attachment 1 (Jan. 28, 2004). The estimated
U.S. MFI for 2004 was $57,500. Id. Current AMIs range from around $20,000 in parts of rural Kentucky
to almost $100,000 in San Francisco County, California.
103. Characteristics2004, supra note 94. This is somewhat less than, but roughly continuous with,
earlier estimates of female-headed public housing households that include more than one person. In 1989,
an estimated 41% of public housing households were female-headed and included two or more persons.
PATRICK A. SIMMoNs, ED., HOUSING STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 299 (1997). In 1993, such
households represented about 42% of public housing households. CHARACTERISTICS 1993, supra note 94,
at 12.
104. See BASELINE 2002, supra note 95, at 2-2 (73% of households are families with children; 90% of
families with children are headed by a single woman; 90% of 73% is 66% of all households).
105. Characteristics2004, supra note 94. In 1998, the average total household income in public
housing was $9,091. PICTURE 1998, supra note 91, at Supplement on Incomes & Household Members 4.
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are African American.10 6 These differentials suggest that "original" households
with children in HOPE VI target projects are at least twice as likely to be headed
by African American women than households with children in public housing
generally.
Unfortunately, the limited data currently available makes it impossible at this
point to understand the demographics of HOPE VI "original" residents in greater
detail. But this limited comparison with the public housing population at large (to
say nothing of the general U.S. population) makes clear that African American
woman-headed households have disproportionately "suffered the effects of living
in the worst public housing, and the same residents later experienced the
10 7
consequences-good and bad-of the changes that HOPE VI brought about.'
B. The Raced and Gendered DisparateImpacts of HOPE VI Failures
The statistical predominance of African American woman-headed households
in HOPE VI target sites strongly suggests that those who have suffered the brunt
of the program's acknowledged shortcomings °8 are extremely poor African
American women-and particularly African American women in caretaking
relationships with children, whether as mother, grandmother, aunt, or guardian.
But even the program's strongest critics have not considered how failing to
monitor and report on project outcomes, improving "bricks-and-mortar" at the
expense of "original" residents and cutting the overall stock of affordable
housing in a gentrifying city's urban core, not accounting for existing structural
racial hypersegregation and isolation from economic opportunity, and subordinating HUD's public mission to market values would cause specifically disparate
gendered as well as raced effects under present conditions of urban core
gentrification and affordable housing crisis.
1. Failing to Monitor and Report Sufficiently on Project Outcomes
Proponents, researchers, and critics alike lament the fact that HUD monitoring
of project outcomes has been, until recently, retrospective and partial at best,10 9
"selective and incomplete"' 10 at worst. So the fact is that we do not know-and
probably can never reconstruct-what has happened to the "original" residents
dispersed by almost the whole first decade of HOPE VI projects because it
apparently occurred to no one to track what happened to them. Even the most
detailed national investigation, the 2002 HOPE VI Resident Tracking Study,
106. BASELINE 2002, supra note 95, at 2-2.
107. Popkin, DECADE, supra note 1, at 8.
108. See, e.g., Popkin Testimony, supra note 4, at 4.
109. See RESIDENT TRACKING 2002, supra note 8, at 6-7.
110. FALSE HOPE, supra note 11, at 33. HUD did not even have a central mechanism to track HOPE
VI activities for at least the first five years of the program. See id. (citing PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS, supra
note 17, at 6).
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considers just eight of the 165 HOPE VI sites, and its sample is further seriously
compromised by the fact that it is a retrospective study. As the authors
acknowledge,
we could only survey those households that we were able to locate through
HUD or [public housing authority] databases and through other types of public
records .... Thus we were more likely to find those residents still living in
public housing or using vouchers than those who no longer received
assistance .... In general, the most difficult people to find in such a tracking

effort are those who move frequently, double up with another family, do not
have a usual place to live (i.e., are homeless), or those who have moved out of
the area. i l '
On this accounting, as many as one-third of all "original" residents seem likely to
have been "lost" in the redevelopment process, 1 2 and, as the authors indicate, are
likelier than the sample population to be facing housing crises. Thus the study's
1 13
finding that 14% (of the sample) have left assisted housing altogether
obviously does not include that 34% of the entire "original" population who
could not be located for the study. 14 A related problem afflicts the similarly
retrospective 2001 study HOPE VI and Section 8: SpatialPatterns in Relocation,
which reports the resettlement patterns of just 31% of HOPE VI relocatees: those
who have received Section 8 voucher assistance. " 5 Only the Panel Study is for
the first time providing a non-retrospective look at not only resettlement
patterns,
6
but also resident opinion of pre- and post-relocation housing." 1
As a result, it is currently impossible to prove or disprove definitively the
hypothesis that, overall, HOPE VI projects have had disparate negative impacts
on the lowest-income African American women who disproportionately form

111. RESIDENT TRACKING 2002, supra note 8, at 6-7.

112. The study had a response rate of 66%. Id. at 7. Although on age, number of children, household
income, and other such indicators the sample population was comparable to the "original" population as a
whole (based on MTCS data for the housing project in the year that the grant was made), gender is
unfortunately not one of the variables compared. See id. at 6-7, App. A-132-33.
113. Id. at ii.
114. One might speculate, further, that the 14% subgroup (some 9% of the whole original population)
might on the whole have left assistance for different reasons than the non-respondent 34%.
115. KINGSLEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 2.
116. According to the False HOPE report, HUD now collects from HOPE VI grantees quarterly
progress reports that include resident relocation data, but does not make this data available to the public.
FALSE HOPE, supra note 11, at 34. It will be imperative for researchers to have access to these reports.
The Panel Study has yielded several reports to date, including: ELIZABETH COVE, MICHAEL EISEMAN,
SUSAN J.

POPKIN, URBAN INST.,

RESILIENT CHILDREN: LrrERATURE REvtaw AND EVIDENCE FROM THE

HOPE VI PANEL STUDY-FINAL REPORT, available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411255-

resilientchildren.pdf; Susan J. Popkin, Mary K. Cunningham, & Martha Burt, Public Housing
Transformation and the Hard-to-House, 16 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 1 (2005), available at http://
www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd-1601_Popkin.pdf; and Embry M. Howell, Laura
E. Harris, Susan J. Popkin, The Health Status of HOPE VI PublicHousing Residents, 16 J. HEALTH CARE
FOR THE POOR & UNDERSERVED 273 (2005).
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their "original" populations. That is, HUD's historical failure to monitor
sufficiently even the whereabouts-let alone other experiences such as landlord
sexual harassment, childcare problems, and homelessness-of "original" residents who do not or cannot return to the revitalized site effaces the probable raceand gender-specific effects of dispersing the residents of HOPE VI target
developments. We can, nevertheless, engage in some informed speculation about
such effects that can and should form a basis for future empirical research.
2. Improving Neighborhoods at the Expense of Neighborhood Residents
Critics of HOPE VI most often and most vociferously argue that, contrary to its
original intended purpose, in practice the program has encouraged local PHAs to
cultivate neighborhoods, not people. The manifestations of this misplaced
emphasis range from pushing "original" residents (very poor and mostly African
American) out of central city sites to make way for gentrifiers (mostly white and
professional-class),' 1 7 to failing to involve "original" residents meaningfully (or
at all) in revitalization planning' 18 (which HUD itself describes as an "essential" 119 part of HOPE VI planning), to failing to provide appropriate and/or
adequate social, support, and/or relocation services to "original" residents of
HOPE VI sites, 120 to breaking up existing
communities and social support
1 21
networks among public housing residents.
In cities where the housing market is "tight," Popkin testified before Congress
12 2
in 2003, "many former residents [end] up in other distressed communities.'"
That is to say, where gentrification is in process, a "substantial proportion"'123_
some 60% 12 4 -of the "original" residents who are permanently displaced by
HOPE VI redevelopment 125 will be relocated to areas that are less poor, but still
not "low-poverty" areas. 126 Because they are disproportionately represented in
the "original" HOPE VI resident population, this likely affects lowest-income
African American women in at least equal disproportion. As income-mixing is a
guiding principle of the program, the fact that at least 60% of non-returning
117. See generally Cunningham, supra note 12; powell & Spencer, supra note 14.
118. See FALSE HOPE, supra note 11, at 17-22; HOPE UNSEEN, supra note 13, at 11-12; see also
Popkin, DECADE, supra note 1, at 39-40.
119. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., [HOPE VI] Community and Supportive Services,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pihlprograms/phlhope6/css/index.cfm.
120. See generally powell & Spencer, supra note 14; HOPE UNSEEN, supra note 13, at 7-8; see also
Popkin Testimony, supra note 4, at 4.
121. See FALSE HOPE, supra note 11, at 37-38; HOPE UNSEEN, supra note 13, at 9-10, 11.
122. Popkin Testimony, supra note 4, at 1.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 3; RESIDENT TRACKiNG 2002, supra note 8, at iv-v.
125. Le., are not able or choose not to return to the redeveloped site for whatever reason, including
receipt of Section 8 vouchers. Id. at iv.
126. Id. at iv-v. That is, they live in neighborhoods with more than 20% poverty rates. Id. Two-thirds
of the 60% are still living in high-poverty neighborhoods (more than 30% of the residents are poor) after
relocation. ld. at v.
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residents are relocating to other poor and extremely poor neighborhoods ought to
be of serious concern. But there are several race- and gender-specific reasons why
this might happen to lowest-income African American women at a rate even
greater than their proportion of the HOPE VI "original" resident population.
A high rate of domestic violence may prevent "original" residents from
returning to the redeveloped site, leaving them in this at-risk group of returnees.
HOPE VI developments typically have new income, credit, criminal record, and
behavior criteria that "original" residents must meet to be readmitted to the
redeveloped housing, standards intended to cut crime and vandalism and to
encourage "self-sufficiency" behaviors including waged work.' 27 But women are
disproportionately affected by such elevated requirements when they are or have
been victims of domestic violence, which extremely poor African American
women experience at rates substantially higher than average. Women in families
with a household income of less than $7,500 experience intimate partner violence
at more than twice the rate that women with household incomes of over $15,000
do and are 61% more likely to suffer domestic violence than women with
household incomes between $7,500 and $15,000.128 And African American
women on the whole experience battering at a 35% higher rate than white women
as a group. 12 9 With a full third of African American female heads of HOPE VI
target site households earning annual income of $5000 or less, these women
would appear to be at a very high risk of intimate partner violence indeed. 3 '
Whether because of the violent behavior of batterering partners or because of the
police presence elicited by such violence, these women can find themselves
excluded or evicted from their rehabilitated former homes-even from other
public housing to which they have relocated.131
Particularly under current welfare restrictions, women who are displaced from
HOPE VI sites may suffer more than men from reduced, disrupted, or missing
social services. Where residents are not fully included in the HOPE VI planning
process, social service packages are that much less likely to incorporate all the
elements to meet the needs and concerns of a mainly impoverished African

127. See, e.g., John J. Ammann, Housing Out the Poor, 19 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 309, 320 (2000).
128. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE

STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 4, 10 (2000), availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjslabstract/
ipv.htm. Similarly, between one-third and two-thirds of welfare recipients report surviving past or
enduring present domestic violence. JODY RAPHAEL & RICHARD M. TOLMAN, TRAPPED BY POVERTY,
TRAPPED BY ABUSE: NEW EVIDENCE DOCUMENTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND

WELFARE, 21 (1997), availableat http://www.ssw.umich.edu/trapped/pubs-trapped.pdf.
129. RENNISON & WELCHAN, supra note 128, at 4.
130. See supra Part H.A.
131. See, e.g., Tara M. Vrettos, Victimizing the Victim: Evicting Domestic Violence Victims from
PublicHousing Based on the Zero-Tolerance Policy, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 97 (2002). Under the new
housing subtitle of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
such evictions and exclusions will now be definitively illegal, at least in project-based Section 8 housing,
the Section 8 voucher program, and public housing. Pub. L. No. 109-162, §§ 601-07; 119 Stat. 2960
(2006). The devil, as ever, will be in the details of implementation.
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American female population. Among these individuals, women with children and
elderly women would probably be most vulnerable to the loss of social networks
ruptured by displacement. Therefore these subsegments of the population may
seek to relocate within reach of existing social networks, potentially at the
expense of neighborhood "quality."
There is reason to believe that HOPE VI's emphasis on housing vouchers may
also leave African American women leaving HOPE VI sites disproportionately
vulnerable to sexual harassment in the private and voucher-based housing
markets. Although public housing officials are of course capable of sexually
harassing their tenants, 132 Section 8 and private landlords multiply exponentially
the possibility that a tenant will be sexually harassed, since tenants deal directly
with individual landlords in these markets. Because women are more vulnerable
to landlord sexual harassment than men, 133 and because some estimate the rate of
sexual harassment in housing to rival that of sexual harassment in employment, 134 voucher use may bring fresh injury to many female-headed households.1 35 Not only economic vulnerability, but also racist cultural assumptions
about African American women's sexuality 136 may further increase this women's
exposure to landlord sexual harassment.
3. Not Accounting for Existing Conditions of Racial Hypersegregation and
Isolation from Economic Opportunity
Empirical studies suggest that HOPE VI has had far greater success in
deconcentrating poverty than in deconcentrating racial segregation for African
Americans. 1 37 But race is also a crucial factor isolating individuals and
neighborhoods from economic opportunity. 138 This fact is exacerbated for
African American women because they are subject to structural sex discrimination in relation to the general population as well as to African American men.
The affordable housing crisis, while undeniably serious for many Americans,
in fact puts most pressure on very low- and extremely low-income people. 139 The

132. See, e.g., Sherri M. Owens, Housing Official Charged in Sex Case; A Woman Said Eviction Was
Threatened andAnother Said the Man Made Sexual Advances, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jun. 24, 2002, at Fl.
133. See Nicole A. Forkenbrock Lindemeyer, Sexual Harassment on the Second Shift: The Misfit
Application of Title VII Employment Standardsto litle VIII Housing Cases, 18 LAW & INEQ. 351 (2000).
134. See id.; Maggie E. Reed, Linda L. Collinsworth, & Louise F. Fitzgerald, There's No Place Like
Home: Sexual Harassmentof Low Income Women in Housing, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 439 (2005).
135. See, e.g., Joan Treadway, N.O. Housing Study Finds Extensive Bias; IncreasedChoices Noted in
Analysis, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, LA) (Apr. 27, 2000), at B 1 (finding high rate of sexual
harassment complaints against Section 8 landlords in New Orleans).
136. See, e.g., such classic studies as: Hazel V. Carby, 'On the Threshold of Woman's Era': Lynching,
Empire, and Sexuality in Black Feminist Theory, 12 CRrICAL INQUIRY 262 (1985); Ann DuCille, The
Occult of True Black Womanhood: CriticalDemeanor and Black Feminist Studies, 19 SIGNS 591 (1994).
137. See, e.g., RESIDENT TRAcKING 2002, supra note 8, at v.
138. See generally, e.g., powell & Spencer, supra note 14; Pindell, supra note 2, at 406-07.
139. FALSE HOPE, supra note 11, at ii-iii, 8-9.
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pressures of affordable housing crisis disproportionately affect the African
American women displaced from HOPE VI redevelopment sites because they are
overwhelmingly extremely-low income. HUD reports that, although the stock of
rental units affordable to low-income people has actually increased in recent
years, the nation lost 1.3 million units (8%) affordable to very low-income people
and 940,000 units (14%) affordable to extremely low-income people between
1991 and 1999.140 Because of the racial dimension of the gender wage
gap-African American women earn, on average, sixty-three cents for every
dollar that white men earn 14 1-African American women "original" residents
who earn wages are substantially less likely to be able to meet higher income
requirements for readmission to redeveloped HOPE VI sites. If just under 20%
return to the redeveloped site,' 42 and just under 30% relocate to other public
housing, 143 most of which remains isolated from current economic opportunities
even when it is less impoverished than the original site, 44 approximately
1 45
one-third of HOPE VI "original" residents are receiving Section 8 vouchers
and another one-fifth facing the private market. 14 6 As a further result of the wage
gap, African American women who are permanently displaced from HOPE VI
sites are much more likely to face housing crises related to ability to pay for rent
or utilities in both the Section 8 and private markets; Popkin estimates that 40%
of all HOPE VI relocatees face such pressures. 147 They are further more likely to
have difficulty affording enough food for their families, as Popkin estimates that
about half of HOPE VI relocatees do.' 4 8 This raises the vulnerability of this
population to homelessness: poorly-managed relocation services-including a
lack of the intensive services that the so-called "hard to house" need149 -- can
fatally destabilize already financially-precarious households, putting lowestincome African American women, especially those with children, at dispropor-

140. Id. (citing Kathryn P. Nelson, Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S. Dep't of
Housing and Urban Development, Testimony Before the House Comm. on FinancialServs., Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity 107th Cong. (2001)). For definitions of low, very low, and
extremely low incomes, see supra note 102.
141. AMY CAIAZZA, ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE

2 (2004), availableat http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/R260.pdf. White women, on the other hand, make
seventy cents on the white male dollar, while African American men make seventy-five cents on the white
male dollar. Id.
142. See RESIDENT TRACKING 2002, supra note 8, at 64.
143. See id.
144. See powell and Spencer, supra note 14.
145. See KINGSLEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 2; RESIDENT TRACKING 2002, supra note 8, at 64. Section 8
vouchers provide a greater, but not unlimited, choice of housing location.
146. Such numbers must remain provisional, however, because this retrospective survey cannot
account for "lost" residents, who may total as much as 20% of the "original" resident population. See
KINGSLEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 3; supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
147. Popkin Testimony, supra note 4, at 3.
148. Id.
149. Id. Popkin notes both the need for and the lack of intensive services for this population, which
inhabits a substantial part of the most severely distressed public housing, the "housing of last resort." Id.
STATES
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tionate risk of eventual homelessness. As commentator Ngai Pindell argues,
housing "[s]trategies that do not engage th[e] underlying apparatus[es of
structural racial and economic segregation] will be ineffective in dismantling
it";150 this is true for the intersection of structural sex discrimination with
structural racial and economic segregation as well.
4. Subordinating HUD's Public Mission to Market Values
The student author of When Hope Falls Short persuasively argues that the
amalgam of public and private values in HOPE VI has resulted in the worst of
both worlds and the best of neither:
[HOPE VI has] narrowed the terms of the public conversation about affordable
housing and diminish[ed] the public space in which this conversation can
occur ....
The economic perspective offers assurances that contract law and
the exercise of choice will produce both efficient and socially desirable
outcomes ... [but i]n the absence of third-party beneficiaries with standing
under HUD contracts, meaningful choice by public housing residents, and
opportunities for public input via notice-and-comment procedures, HOPE VI's
public and private partners have been insulated from significant sources of
accountability. At the same time, the rigor of data collection and analysis and
the vibrancy of collective debate over public purposes have been squelched.151
Most obviously for lowest-income African American women, the loss of public
accountability mechanisms to the market's "cult of efficiency" ' 152 Means that
their interests as a constituency, which are traditionally underrepresented in any
event, are that much more likely to be overridden by powerful market forces.
Indeed, because tenants have no right to sue to enforce tenant-participation
requirements of HUD-PHA HOPE VI contracts, this constituency in fact has no
right to have its interests aired, considered, debated, or included in the planning
process. Public-private partnerships should check market mechanisms with
public values such as fair housing standards.
As a result of structural defects and managerial failures in the HOPE VI
program, lowest-income African American women have likely suffered harms
that are distinct-not merely in degree, but in kind-from those suffered by poor
black or white men or poor white women, even those who have been similarly
displaced from HOPE VI target projects. It is not merely in an additive sense that
lowest-income African American women displaced by HOPE VI redevelopment
will have suffered the racist and sexist effects of the present conditions of the
American housing landscape, then, but convergently or "intersectionally." Those

150. Pindell, supra note 2, at 406.
151. When Hope Falls Short, supra note 15, at 1497-98.

152. Id. at 1497.
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who collect empirical data on HOPE VI must reanalyze all available data to
determine the extent of these intersectional harms and plan future analyses to
detect them as well.
III. WHAT Is To BE DONE? REMEDYING HOPE VI's
RACE- AND GENDER-DISPARATE IMPACTS

As is, HOPE VI seems destined to continue concentrating its most damaging
effects on some of the country's most vulnerable people unless it is significantly
reformed. Until and unless there is serious policy reform, HOPE VI site
"original" residents should organize to obtain legal remedies for the program's
53
disparate impact to date. 1
A. DisparateImpact Litigation
If my hypothesis is correct, various criteria used in HOPE VI redevelopment
that are apparently race- and gender-neutral-for site selection, "original"
resident readmission, relocation policies, etc.-have a disparate discriminatory
effect on lowest-income African American women. But, under the Fair Housing
Act of 1968, (hereinafter FHA), 154 HUD is obligated to "administer the programs
related to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the
[FHA] policies" of promoting integration and prohibiting discrimination in
housing. 155 Individuals are entitled to sue to enforce their rights not to be
discriminated against in housing on the basis of, among other things, race and
sex. Both intentional discrimination and actions and policies that have an
unintended discriminatory effect are actionable. 56 That is, even when a policy is
not discriminatory on its face, HUD is still responsible for ensuring that it does
not disproportionately and negatively affect a protected class of people.
"Original" HOPE VI residents who are African American women, twice over a
protected class under the FHA, should institute disparate impact litigation to
vindicate their rights under that law.
In brief, there would be three steps to disparate impact analysis under the FHA
in this case: 1) Is there aprimafaciecase of disparate impact on the plaintiffs? 2)
If the answer is yes, is there a countervailing justifying government purpose? 3) If
the answer is yes, would another, less discriminatory policy serve the govern-

153. As the False HOPEreport points out, HUD's failure to promulgate notice-and-comment rules for
the program violates HUD's own general regulations on rulemaking. See FALSE HOPE, supra note 11.
There may therefore also be a case for judicial review of the agency decision not to regulate for the
program, but this possibility is beyond the scope of this note.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006).
156. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,211 (1972) (cited in Dana L. Miller,
Comment, HOPE VI and Title VIII: How a Justifying Government PurposeCan Overcome the Disparate
Impact Problem, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1277 n.43 (2003)).
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ment's interests equally
well?-i.e., is the government's proffered justification a
"mere pretext"? 57 Establishing the prima facie case of whether the policy "bears
more heavily on one [protected class] than another"' 158 would probably not be
difficult, since "original" residents of HOPE VI sites are overwhelmingly
members of protected classes. 159 It is at the subsequent stages of the analysis that
commentator Dana L. Miller suggests that this litigation would fail.
Miller offers four possible countervailing justifications that the government
might offer in such a case: integrated living patterns, urban revitalization,
resident self-sufficiency, and PHA efficiency.' 6° Of course, this would be a
site-specific, fact-intensive analysis in each disparate impact case brought. In
some cases, there would be manifest illegitimate purpose to meet the required
showing that present policies are "mere pretext";16 1 in others, plaintiffs would
need to offer less discriminatory alternative policies that HOPE VI could institute
in order to achieve the same four ends. 162 But, generally speaking, none of these
goals deserve to qualify as justifying government purposes under the FHA
because the program's record casts doubt on its policies' relevance to and impact
on all four. As discussed in Part I.B of this Note, even the limited existing
empirical studies indicate that HOPE VI does little to promote racial integration. 163 Empirically and theoretically, the benefits of mixed-income development
without adequate support and community-building services are in serious doubt
as well,' 64 and some housing advocates argue that HOPE VI mixed income
redevelopment practice is "unnecessary and inconsistent" in any event.1 65 On the
basis of legislative history alone, neighborhood revitalization should be adjudged
subordinate to resident support, gentrification subordinate to uplift, bricks
subordinate to people.1 6 6 To date, there has been little systematic evaluation of
whether HOPE VI community and supportive services programs have successfully helped "original" residents move toward self-sufficiency. 167 Further,
resident self-sufficiency must be assessed not by the success only of those who
are able to return to the redeveloped site, but by the successes or difficulties
157. See Miller, supra note 156, at 1293. As Miller notes, housing discrimination doctrine "has
developed largely through analogy to existing [employment discrimination] doctrine." Id. at 1292.
158. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (quoted in Miller, supra note 156, at 1295).
159. See supra, Part ll.A; Miller, supra note 156, at 1292-96 (discussing circuit split on the prima
facie case standard in housing discrimination cases and concluding that "virtually any" HOPE VI
decision would have a disparate impact on members of a protected class).
160. See Miller, supra note 156, at 1300-03.
161. E.g., Boston's Clippership development. See infra note 17.
162. See Miller, supra note 156, at 1304-07.
163. See supra note 137 and accompanying text; see also Pindell, supra note 2, at 425-429; Florence
Wagman Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discriminationand Segregation in Federally
FinancedHousing, 48 How. L. J. 913, 922-24 (2005).
164. See, e.g., Susan J. Popkin, et al., The GautreauLegacy: What Might Mixed-Income and Dispersal
StrategiesMean for the PoorestPublic Housing Tenants?, 11 HousING POL'Y DEBATE 911,928 (2000).
165. FALSE HOPE, supra note 11, at 13.
166. See supra Part I.B.
167. Popkin, DECADE, supra note 1, at 39.
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experienced by those permanently displaced from the site as well; the courts
should not reward "cherry-picking" the tenant population. And, finally, PHA
efficiency is important, but lack of central federal control ought not to be merely
assumed to result in greater local efficiency. Nor should PHA efficiency be
controlling; if the ultimate goal of fair housing is not being advanced, efficiency
is meaningless. In sum, though in theory Miller's four justifying government
purposes can "embody the concept that the government has a legitimate interest
in promoting the production of affordable housing," courts should determine that
in HOPE VI practice they have not contributed to that ultimate aim.
Disparate impact litigation on behalf of African American woman "original"
HOPE VI site residents would certainly not be easy: there is not yet a great deal of
case law that considers sexual harassment in housing, 168 for example, or that
comprehends the unique harms that may occur at the intersection of identity
categories. 169 But there is some precedent for each, and this litigation could lead
the way in developing both of these areas of the law.
B. StartingPointsfor Policy Reform
The necessary complement to resident litigation to remedy past discrimination
is policy reform to prevent present and future discrimination. The essential policy
reforms would include:
" Making requirements for "original" tenant participation in project planning
enforceable by tenants in court;
• Reinstating a genuine one-for-one replacement requirement;
" Standardizing criteria for returning to HOPE VI developments that do not
penalize victims of domestic violence and account for the raced and gendered
wage gap;
" Rather than leveraging public housing to encourage gentrification, leveraging gentrification to develop "opportunity housing" 170 that brings public
housing residents closer to jobs, services, and resources; and
" Encouraging collaboration between HOPE VI site planners and city PHAs to

168. But see Forkenbrock Lindemeyer, supra note 133, at n.35 (list of cases).
169. But see, e.g., Harrington v. Cleburne Co. Board of Educ., 251 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 2001)
(accepting option of "an 'intersectional' theory of discrimination, that is that the defendant treated [the
plaintiff] disparately because she belongs simultaneously to two or more protected classes," although
plaintiff did not wish to pursue this theory); Lain v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir.
1994) ("when a plaintiff is claiming race and sex bias, it is necessary to determine whether the employer
discriminates on the basis of that combination of factors, not just whether it discriminates against people
of the same race or of the same sex" (emphasis in original)); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406,
1416-17 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding that "a trial court may aggregate evidence of racial hostility with
evidence of sexual hostility" in employment discrimination context).
170. See powell & Spencer, supra note 14.
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ensure that projects take holistic, long-term-not short-term, neighborhood-

by-neighborhood-views of metropolitan health.17
CONCLUSION

As a matter of law as well as of justice, HUD must move to correct HOPE VI's
disparate impacts on lowest-income African American women. If the political
climate in which HOPE VI came into existence and developed into its present
incarnation was unfriendly to the concerns I have raised here, however, then
surely the present political climate is outright hostile. Even during the economically booming 1990s, HUD secretary Cisneros had to "'hope[] against reason' to
preserve a status quo that [was] at a record level of distress."' 72 If in 1996
low-income housing was "an unpopular cause at a time when even popular
causes [had] trouble getting financed," how much less of a priority must this issue
be in the midst of a "jobless recovery" following a long recession? 73 The
controversy surrounding HUD's management of HOPE VI can hardly have made
this flagship program more politically appealing, particularly to those already
skeptical about the Department and the project of subsidized low-income
housing.' 7 4 And very poor African American women, as a constituency, continue
to suffer not only from objective lack of political influence but also from the
scurrilous myth of the "welfare queen," that toxic spawn of racism, classism, and
misogyny. 175
With other HUD funding for new housing development at a virtual standstill,
and the Bush administration attempting to destroy even this program, advocates
may be tempted simply to attempt to preserve the HOPE VI status quo. Of course,
HOPE VI must be preserved; it is the only remaining federal source of new public
housing development. Even if the Bush administration succeeds in permanently
doing away with it, however, many grants currently remain outstanding, and
there is ample opportunity remaining to prevent the failures of the past from
being replicated as these projects move toward completion.
Like many of the people now coming to the end of their welfare benefits as a
result of its 1998 "reform," HUD's HOPE VI as currently configured seems
destined to fail quietly while giving a superficial appearance of success. 1 7 6 Like
those shrinking welfare rolls, HOPE VI neighborhoods look nicer. But researchers have only begun to ask what is actually happening to the individuals who are

171. See LISA

ROBINSON & ANDREW GRANT-THoMAS, RACE, PLACE, AND

METROPOLTrAN OPPORTUNITY AGENDA

HoME: A CivIL

RIGHTS AND

(2004).

172. DeParle, supra note 18, at 68.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Husock, supra note 23, at 50.
175. See, e.g., Crooms, "Underclass," supra note 92.
176. Cf. id.; Crooms, Fatherlessness,supra note 70, (discussing the cultural and legal dimensions of
Reaganite privatization followed by Clintonite "welfare reform" for poor African Americans, including
for housing policy of particular relevance to poor African American men and women).
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dispersed from the public housing units eliminated by HOPE VI redevelopment.
When the HOPE VI panel study is complete, we may have a more complete
picture, but in the meantime the seeming successes of cleared welfare rolls and
"revitalized" urban neighborhoods may only be temporarily hiding far greater
future problems. This is particularly worrisome if, as I have suggested, the HOPE
VI program has a disproportionate negative impact on lowest-income African
American woman-headed households, especially those with children. I have
outlined here a set of hypotheses that must of course be confirmed or refuted by
further empirical research on the HOPE VI "original" resident population. If
confirmed, however, disparate impact litigation could be an appropriate remedy:
to prevent another "disaster in every generation" 177 that mires very poor African
American women and their children in the most extreme poverty and to force
programmatic reform that seriously commits to providing these families with
genuine "opportunity housing."

177. FitzPatrick, supra note 13.
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